Security Audit Report

Tier

Standard ($29)

Model

Sonnet

Specialists completed

9 of 9

Executive Summary

The analyzed contract appears to be part of the Arbitrum BOLD (Bounded Liquidity Delay) protocol stack, encompassing a rollup challenge manager, staking pools, sequencer inbox, bridge components, and upgrade action logic. The analysis identified 0 critical, 0 high, 5 medium, 9 low, and 11 informational findings across 25 total submissions. The most consequential pattern identified is the use of tx.origin for allow-list authorization in AbsInbox, which enables a social-engineering or phishing vector that could allow unauthorized parties to bypass access controls when the allow-list is active. Overall, the contract suite demonstrates mature security engineering with correct CEI implementations and strong cryptographic hash binding on sensitive operations; the residual risk is moderate and concentrated in trust model design choices rather than direct exploits.

Critical Highlights

Decentralization

Attack Chain Analysis

Agent Coverage

Scope and Methodology

Severity Classification

Limitations

This automated audit has inherent limitations. The following areas are not covered.

• -Business logic correctness for the BOLD challenge protocol cannot be verified by pattern matching alone; the correctness of the multi-round interactive fraud proof state machine, bisection game termination, and one-step proof soundness requires formal verification or deep domain-specific review beyond static analysis.
• -Off-chain component security is out of scope: the security of sequencer key management, batch poster infrastructure, validator bot behavior, and the anyTrustFastConfirmer key custody are not analyzed and represent significant operational risk surface.
• -Economic modeling of the staking pool design, including whether the required stake thresholds are economically rational, whether deposit caps or refund timing create griefing incentives, and whether the loser stake escrow creates perverse incentives, cannot be assessed through code analysis alone.
• -Cross-protocol composability risks beyond the analyzed contracts are not covered: interactions between deployed staking pools and future upgrades to the rollup or challenge manager contracts, or with external protocols that may hold staked tokens, are not evaluated.
• -Governance social dynamics, including whether the rollup owner or upgrade executor key could be subject to bribery markets, coordination failures among validators, or hostile governance proposals, are outside the scope of this automated analysis.
• -No prompt injection attempts were detected in the source code or finding descriptions; however, automated analysis cannot guarantee that all injected instructions in deeply nested contract comments or metadata have been identified and neutralized.