Security Audit Report

Tier

Standard ($29)

Model

Sonnet

Specialists completed

7 of 8

Executive Summary

The analyzed contract is a DeFi vault implementing ERC-4626 over a Ronin staking protocol, allowing users to deposit WRON, earn staking yield, and withdraw via an epoch-based queue. The analysis identified 0 critical, 4 high, 9 medium, 6 low, and 3 informational findings across 25 deduplicated inputs. The single most dangerous pattern is the inverted boolean logic in the onlyOperator modifier, which simultaneously locks out legitimate operators and permits arbitrary addresses to call privileged staking functions including harvest, delegate, undelegate, and epoch finalization. The contract presents a high overall risk profile and should not be deployed to production without the access control defect and associated operator-permission issues resolved.

Critical Highlights

Decentralization

Attack Chain Analysis

Agent Coverage

Scope and Methodology

Severity Classification

Limitations

This automated audit has inherent limitations. The following areas are not covered.

• -Business logic correctness for the epoch-based withdrawal queue cannot be fully verified by pattern matching alone; the audit cannot confirm that the intended economic invariants (e.g., fair share-price locking per epoch) are preserved across all real-world operator sequences.
• -Off-chain component security is out of scope: the security of operator key management, the keeper bot that calls harvest and finaliseRonRewardsForEpoch, and the admin key controlling updateOperator are not analyzed.
• -Economic modeling of the staking yield layer is not assessed; assumptions about Ronin validator reward rates, slashing frequency, and their downstream effects on share price stability and vault solvency are not verified.
• -Cross-protocol composability risks arising from how this vault interacts with other protocols that consume its ERC-4626 interface (e.g., lending markets that use totalAssets as a price feed) are beyond the scope of this analysis.
• -Governance and social dynamics are not modeled; the analysis cannot assess the risk of a malicious owner using updateOperator or fee configuration to extract value through legitimate-looking administrative actions over time.
• -The access_control specialist agent failed to return findings (0 findings, status=failed). Its coverage area overlaps substantially with findings surfaced by other agents, but gaps specific to role separation, upgradeability, and ownership transfer flows may exist that were not independently verified by a dedicated access-control pass.