Security Audit Report

Tier

Standard ($29)

Model

Sonnet

Specialists completed

8 of 8

Executive Summary

The analyzed contract is the Wildcat Protocol, a permissioned fixed-rate lending market system with hooks-based access control, role provider credential management, and factory-driven market deployment. The analysis identified 0 critical, 2 high, 7 medium, 10 low, and 8 informational findings across 27 total reported items. The single most dangerous pattern is the missing market registration check on the hooks contract's onQueueWithdrawal function, which allows any caller to manipulate lender credential state via attacker-controlled role providers. Overall, the contract carries moderate-to-high risk; several logic errors and access control gaps in the hooks subsystem require remediation before production deployment, particularly for lender-adverse scenarios in fixed-term markets.

Critical Highlights

Decentralization

Attack Chain Analysis

Agent Coverage

Scope and Methodology

Severity Classification

Limitations

This automated audit has inherent limitations. The following areas are not covered.

• -Business logic correctness: The audit detects pattern-level issues in code structure but cannot verify whether the protocol's intended economic or legal behavior (e.g., fixed-term contractual obligations, borrower repayment obligations) is correctly encoded. Intent divergence from implementation is not detectable by static analysis alone.
• -Off-chain component security: The security of role provider infrastructure, keeper bots that process withdrawal queues, admin key management for the arch controller owner, and API services that supply hooksData blobs to callers are entirely outside the scope of this analysis.
• -Economic modeling: The viability of the interest rate model, reserve ratio adequacy under stress, withdrawal queue mechanics under mass-exit scenarios, and liquidity assumptions for the underlying asset markets have not been evaluated.
• -Cross-protocol composability: Interactions between Wildcat markets and external DeFi protocols (e.g., use of market tokens as collateral in lending protocols, integration with DEX liquidity pools) have not been analyzed for emergent exploit paths beyond the contracts examined.
• -Governance and social dynamics: The arch controller owner has broad powers over template registration and fee configuration. Voter behavior, key compromise scenarios, multi-sig coordination risks, and bribery or coercion of key holders are outside the scope of automated analysis.
• -SphereX integration: The SphereXProtectedRegisteredBase engine integration adds an external access control and monitoring layer whose internal logic, upgrade path, and potential for liveness interference have not been independently audited here.